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“We were spared a bomb tonight, but I wonder. 
I wonder if we weren't destroyed even without it.” 
 
The Twilight Zone, “The Shelter”1 
 
Introduction 
 The iconic fallout shelter episode of The Twilight Zone aired on October 6th, 1961, 
revealing a simple but profound truth about the development of nuclear weaponry that still 
resonates within American culture today: although the United States has thus far been spared a 
mushroom cloud, the fear of nuclear war has caused other less obvious, but pervasive, damage to 
American society. The development and use of nuclear weapons in WWII thrust the United 
States into a secular apocalyptic age, replacing utopia with dystopia, encapsulating what Charles 
Taylor dubbed “the malaise of modernity.”2 Intellectualism, rationality, and scientific progress 
brought Western society farther than ever imaginable—until it backfired. Now many Americans 
and others living in countries with nuclear technology live in a world dominated by fear of 
humanity’s own creation and other dystopian, sci-fi horrors. Nuclear wastelands, sentient 
technology, catastrophic weather, and hordes of science fiction creations continue to proliferate 
in media and culture, and the consequences of nuclear alarmism impacts other aspects of society, 
including attitudes towards mitigating anthropogenic global climate change.  
Although modernity has been developing for decades, arguably starting with the initial 
industrialization of war in WWI, the development of nuclear weapons accelerated the secular 
apocalyptic mindset from 1945 onwards. Initially in the United States, the apocalypse was a 
strictly religious concept stemming from John’s Revelation in the Bible. However, with the 
																																																						
1 “The Twilight Zone S03E03 ‘The Shelter.’” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ManzhqUrSP4.  
2 Taylor, Charles. The Malaise of Modernity. House of Anansi: 1991.		
	
	
4	
development of weapons of mass destruction, the apocalypse assumed a second form, a secular 
one. Now due to nuclear weapons, a very real catastrophic apocalypse can occur at any time 
without the helping hand of God. Thus, the “secular” apocalypse in this case means 
anthropogenic. With the development of nuclear weapons, humanity created something capable 
of destroying human civilization. As Taylor argues, “our dystopias are different from the 
apocalypses we saw in the past--in the history of the Christians, Jews, Hindus, and others--
because they take a secular form.”3 What changed is that in the religious apocalyptic, God is in 
ultimate control of humanity’s fate. In the secular apocalyptic, humanity becomes its own 
demise: “Ironically, although we live in a universe where we are in charge, all we see on the 
horizon is our end. This is dystopia.”4 Secular apocalyptic beliefs are widespread in pop culture, 
including shows like Mad Men and Breaking Bad, which (Joustra, R & Wilkerson, A, 2016) 
analyze in depth in their book How to Survive the Apocalypse. The rise of the secular apocalyptic 
in mass media suggests how pervasive nuclear fear became after WWII, fears that are still keenly 
felt today.  
Although the Nuclear Age began 60 years ago, the psychological and behavioral effects 
of nuclear alarmism are just as relevant for study today. Colin S. Gray has already argued that 
the end of the Cold War did not bring a post-nuclear era, but a second nuclear age.5 By a second 
nuclear age, Gray is indicating that although nuclear fear is not the same as it was during the 
height of the Cold War, the potential for nuclear war still influences many aspects of American 
culture in new and evolving ways.6 The reality of nuclear weapons is not merely a phenomenon 
																																																						
3 Joustra, Robert. Wilkerson, Alissa. How to Survive the Apocalypse: Zombies, Cylons, Faith, 
and Politics at the End of the World. William B. Eerdmans Publishing: Grand Rapids, 2016, 4.  
4 Ibid, 5.  
5 Colin S. Gray. The Second Nuclear Age. Lynne Rienner Publishers, UK: 1999, 1.  
6 Ibid, 1. 
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but a condition7, a way of existing in American society. One of the consequences of living in a 
nuclear age is a widespread fatalist mindset towards nuclear disarmament, and even the fate of 
the planet itself. The journal Social Problems identifies the “widespread sense of futility on the 
part of most Americans who feel that nuclear war is not something they can help avert...[thus] 
they tend to retreat into fatalistic lethargy.”8 Starting with the creation of nuclear weapons during 
and after WWII, a paralyzing fatalistic attitude towards the planet’s fate has developed in 
American society. As the current secular apocalyptic culture develops, fatalism has only 
increased and spread to other phenomena besides nuclear war. Specifically, the secular 
apocalyptic has given rise to climate change fatalism that discourages mitigation by subtly 
reminding Americans that the world could end any minute from nuclear war anyway.  
If nuclear war is perceived as apocalyptic and inevitable, this would significantly impact 
how average citizens vote for policies that effect generations ahead of our time. This extends past 
policies on war and nuclear disarmament, but also attitudes towards mitigating anthropogenic 
climate change. Per Espen Stoknes in his book, What We Think About When We Try Not To 
Think About Global Warming, raises the question, “Are we humans inescapably locked into 
short-termism?” 9 The persistent failure of policies that are meant to benefit generations ahead, 
and the failure of conventional forms of communicating the dangers of global climate change 
leads me to believe that the more pressing question to ask is: Why are we inescapably locked into 
short-termism? Why haven’t we seen significant progress towards mitigating climate change in 
the last twenty years? My answer to this question comes from a Religious Studies perspective: 
																																																						
7 Ibid, 155.  
8 Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground, New York University Press, New York and 
London: 2001, 188. 	
9 Stoknes, Per Espen. What We Think About When We Try Not To Think About Global Warming. 
Chelsea Green Publishing: Vermont, 2015. Print, xvii.  
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the apocalyptic fears surrounding nuclear winter influenced emerging discourse about 
anthropogenic climate change, causing climate change to be seen as apocalyptic as well; climate 
change fatalism, born out of the secular apocalyptic, continues to function in American society 
today as a secular apocalyptic religion. The functionalist theory of religion will help shed light 
on how a religious concept like apocalypticism can adopt a secular form and subtly influence the 
actions of people who do not profess a religion at all. These secular apocalyptic beliefs impact 
climate change alarmists, encouraging fatalist attitudes towards mitigating climate change.  
This argument uses the concept of “apocalyptic” in a few distinct ways. The first is 
defining the secular apocalyptic, a cultural mindset and genre in mass culture. This paper argues 
that nuclear weapons accelerated the secular apocalyptic since nuclear war could cause a 
catastrophic ending to civilization at any moment, an apocalypse of its own. Then, climate 
change fatalism is argued to function itself as a secular apocalyptic religion in American society. 
Thus, the idea of apocalypse is being used to describe two separate phenomena: the rise of 
secular apocalyptic culture, and how a phenomenon functions as an apocalyptic religion itself. 
This paper’s thesis has been divided into several sections to help explain how the argument 
progresses: 
1. The rise of the secular apocalyptic in American culture 
2. Exploring fatalism and self-fulfilling prophecies  
3. The emergence of nuclear winter alarmism and how it influenced climate change 
discourse 
4. Defining and applying the functionalist theory of religion 
5. How climate change fatalism fits into the definition of secular apocalyptic 
religion 
	
	
7	
6. How climate change discourse could use the apocalyptic to encourage mitigation 
7. Conclusion: the ultimately redemptive message of the apocalypse 
This paper is split into various sections to help organize and further the thesis outlined 
above. First, I will discuss the difference between the secular apocalyptic and the religious 
tradition it evolved from. Then I will discuss the functionalist theory of religion, and then the 
concept of fatalism as a philosophical idea and how fatalism causes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Then I will discuss the apocalyptic fears inherent in nuclear power, the coining of the term 
“nuclear winter,” and how emerging discussions about anthropogenic climate change were 
influenced by the concept of nuclear winter, so much so that the ecological apocalyptic emerged. 
Then I will describe how climate change fatalism fits into the definition of a secular apocalyptic 
religion using the functionalist perspective of religion, and conclude by examining how climate 
change discourse could be changed to discourage fatalism and encourage mitigation. Knowing 
that climate change fatalism functions as an apocalyptic religion could be used to an advantage, 
since apocalyptic doctrine is inherently hopeful and redemptive.  
The first step to discussing how nuclear war and climate change fatalism are connected is 
to identify and examine the emergence of a non-religious apocalyptic worldview that is unique to 
the modern age.  
Religious v. Secular Apocalypses  
The secular apocalyptic emerged from a long-standing tradition of biblical prophetic 
belief in America. But why are these apocalyptic beliefs so popular in American culture 
specifically? This section will briefly explain the biblical origin of apocalyptic beliefs, and 
articulate how nuclear war fits two scholars’ definitions of an apocalyptic religion, Frederick 
Buell and Barry Brummett. While American secular culture was busy forming their own 
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opinions about the atomic bomb, the Christian religious community faced their own dilemmas. 
Was the bomb a gift from God or Satan? Would God praise or punish America for using the 
atomic bomb? Dozens of prophetic works came out in the years following 1945, outlining where 
the Bible predicted the atomic bomb and where it fits into America’s eschatology.10 Since the 
spiritual and secular realms overlap, previous scholars have found it difficult to tease apart the 
many contradictions nuclear prophecy purports. Some premillennialists keep their religious 
beliefs separate from politics, some use their eschatology to encourage nuclear disarmament, and 
some go so far to encourage nuclear destruction to usher in the Second Coming.11 Historian Paul 
Boyer has done extensive research already on the history of prophetic apocalyptic belief in 
America and the cultural significance of nuclear war in his works When Time Shall Be No More, 
Fallout, and From the Bomb’s Early Light. 
 The majority of apocalyptic beliefs persisting in American culture today originate with 
the Revelation of John, the last book of the Christian Bible. In its most simple form, 
“apocalypse” or apokalypsis in Greek, means “unveiling” or “revealing”.12 Verses like the 
following have been re-interpreted and re-imagined by every reader of the Bible, being 
developed into different ideas of how the end times will manifest. Revelation 12:8-9 states, “The 
great dragon was hurled down—that ancient serpent called the devil, or Satan, who leads the 
whole world astray. He was hurled to the earth and all his angels with him.”13 Sometimes this is 
interpreted this to mean a literal war between angels and demons in heaven, other times authors 
																																																						
10 Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 133. 
11 Ibid, 303.		
12	Alex Heard, Apocalypse Pretty Soon: Travels in End Time America, W.W. Norton & 
Company, New York, 1999, 16. 
13	Revelation 12:7-9, NIV. 
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Revelation+12&version=NIV 
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have predicted devastating meteor showers. After WWII, prophetic literature began to interpret 
apocalyptic scenes as nuclear war, arguing that the biblical writers described nuclear bombs in 
visions in terms they could understand, such as fire and brimstone.14 Within an apocalyptic 
framework, history is defined as linear and determined.15 A linear timeline for humanity is 
ingrained in American ideas of progress, and implies that major events in time are pre-ordained 
by God. Essentially, “apocalyptic” means that humanity is barreling towards its end, bringing 
both mass destruction and infinite joy from a higher power. John’s Revelation continues to be a 
cornerstone in prophetic belief in religious America, now being incorporated in secular 
apocalyptic culture.  
Charles Lippy argues in his essay “Waiting for the End” that millenarianism, the belief 
that a revelation and thousand-year reign of peace is imminent, made America the most fertile 
ground for apocalyptic beliefs. Lippy argues that the process of Americanization among British 
colonies “made millenarianism the common vital possession of American Christians.”16 Thus, 
“The Americanization of the apocalyptic tradition” is central to building an American identity 
before and during the Revolution.17 Religious movements that have adopted and continue to 
adopt an imminent eschaton in their doctrine includes Mormons, Seventh Day Adventists, and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.18 Although these groups are more likely to incorporate eschatology into 
weekly doctrine and are more likely to make predictions about when the Second Coming will 
																																																						
14 Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 142. 
15 Ibid, 34.  
16 Lois Zamora. The Apocalyptic Vision in America: Interdisciplinary Essays on Myth and 
Culture. Bowling Green University Press, 1982, 42.  
17 Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 69. 
18 Zamora, 43.		
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happen, general belief in the Second Coming extends well beyond these niche denominations.19 
This confirms Boyer’s argument that “even when downplayed by church doctrine, eschatological 
belief remain[s] vigorously alive, influencing events in complex and unexpected ways.”20 
Apocalyptic beliefs are ingrained in American culture both inside and outside of conservative 
Christian communities and affect the nation as a whole.  
The entrance of nuclear war into American culture can be considered an apocalypse in 
itself, one that caused apocalyptic beliefs to spill from religious communities into secular culture. 
Relevant definitions of apocalypse have already been formed by previous scholars. Buell 
believes that the following four factors of Judeo-Christian apocalyptic tradition parallel the 
entrance of nuclear war into the American mindset: “sudden rupture with the past, presentation 
of a revelation, narration of a world-end, and dramatization of judgment.”21 Nuclear war 
completely changed the meaning of existing in American society. Although already heavily 
influenced by exceptionalism, having a weapon of mass destruction raised exceptionalism to its 
height. Americans grappled with simultaneous pride for having and using the atom bomb on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and fear that retaliation would be swift and brutal.22 Although the fear 
of retaliation waned with different political environments, it merely shifted from WWII to 
Vietnam to Cold War to Iran to North Korea fears about atomic annihilation. It’s essential to 
realize that although the Nuclear Age ended, society did not revert back to what it was before 
WWII. Nuclear fears continued to evolve, as Gray details thoroughly in A Second Nuclear Age. 
																																																						
19	Barker DC and Bearce DH (2013) End-times theology, the shadow of the future, and public 
resistance to addressing global climate change. Political Research Quarterly 66(2): 267-279.  
20 Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More, 46.  
21 Skrimshire. Future Ethics, 13.  
22 Paul Boyer. Fallout: A historian reflects on America’s half-century encounter with nuclear 
weapons. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998, 14.  
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The first two of Buell’s four factors of apocalypse, “sudden rupture with the past” and 
“presentation of a revelation” occurred simultaneously with the development of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear power brought both a sudden rupture with the past and new revelations. 
Atomic weapons were either viewed as a new height of scientific progress and American power, 
or as the science-fiction horror story “progress turned against us,” fearing that humanity had 
mistakenly created its own demise. According to Boyer, “The atomic bomb announcement was, 
indeed, a psychic events of unprecedented proportions.”23 Many hopes were inspired by atomic 
power, everything from dreams of creating a world state to new developments in farming 
technology.24 However, the negative effects of nuclear war persisted far longer than its potential 
benefits. Nuclear power plants boiled and leaked, the optimistic hope of unlimited energy never 
came to fruition. The atomic bomb’s “fundamental message ‘civilization can perish’ stalled 
confidence in the meaning of progress” outbalanced its power as a potential benefactor of 
society.25 President Truman articulated these realizations in one of his last statements on the 
atomic bomb: “War’s new meaning may not yet be grasped by all the people who would be its 
victims...The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at 
one blow, demolish great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past.”26 
The use of atomic weapons changed war after 1945, changed the meaning of living in American 
society, and introduced terrifying revelations about the dangers of human progress, all of which 
would be later expressed in pop culture.  
																																																						
23 Paul Boyer. From the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the 
Atomic Age. The University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill and London, 1985, 21. 
24 Ibid, 34.  
25 Boyer, From the Bomb’s, 1985, 125, 278.  
26 Boyer, Fallout, 1998, 39.  
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The third of Buell’s four factors of an apocalypse is “narration of an end-time scenario.” 
Pop culture became heavily influenced by the secular apocalyptic after 1945, creating world-
ending scenarios both influenced by America’s history of biblical prophetic belief, yet also 
wholly separate and unique. According to Boyer, “the idea of nuclear weapons—and the terror 
they spawned—remained embedded in U.S. mass culture for the next forty years and beyond.”27 
These apocalyptic narratives played out in other books like the bestseller A Canticle for 
Leibowitz, shows like The Twilight Zone, and now in video games like Bioshock and Fallout. 
The continued use of apocalyptic narratives in Western media will be discussed in depth later in 
this essay, and is one of the strongest indications that although WWII and Cold War fears have 
diminished, nuclear fears continue to function as a secular apocalyptic religion.  
That last of Buell’s defining factors for apocalypse is the dramatization of a last 
judgment, and Buell does not believe that the atomic age fulfilled that last quality. He states, 
“The bomb brought devastation but not judgment or salvation."28 However, I disagree, and argue 
that the Nuclear Age was rich with notions of divine judgment. This can be seen in President 
Truman’s first public statement after Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “We thank God that it has come 
to us instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for 
His purposes.”29 This statement invokes both the ideas of judgment and salvation, and 
perpetuates notions of American exceptionalism. The atom bomb was argued to have been used 
for the salvation of Western civilization, redemption for victims of the Holocaust, and judgment 
on the Japanese. This salvation theme was used in later years, as an argument for using nuclear 
warfare against Communist enemies. Salvation has even been used to describe the potential 
																																																						
27 Boyer, Fallout, 1998, 200. 
28 Skrimshire. Future Ethics, 16.  
29 Boyer, From the Bomb’s, 1985, 6. 
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nuclear war with North Korea, calling a potential strike on North Korea “preventative.”30 The 
notion of “preventative” nuclear war implies that striking a country with nuclear weapons would 
save America from later destruction. Thus, the entrance of nuclear war into American fits into all 
four aspects of Buell’s apocalypse.  
Barry Brummett has his own definitions of an apocalypse that coincide with Buell’s. 
Brummett argues that an apocalypse must be unexpected, inexplicable, and change what we call 
“the true society.”31 Although apocalyptic denotes that time is determined, when the actual “end” 
will happen is unknown. Except for those few who worked on the Manhattan project, the 
majority of Americans woke up to newspaper headlines that they never dreamed possible. 
Brummett specifies that not all change creates an apocalyptic mindset.32 The kind of shift in 
culture that America experience after the creation of nuclear technology is not one that can be 
easily repeated by different events, making nuclear alarmism unique. For example, ecological 
apocalypticists share a similar idea: a secular but uncontrollable force (climate change) is 
bringing an imminent end to the world as we know it, and with it simultaneous terrible death and 
destruction and renewal, a return to Eden.33 Brummett also argues that “The antinuclear 
movements is based on an apocalyptic premise. It exhibits a fascination with the precise details 
of the Final Days that can only be called religious.”34 The imminent end associated with 
apocalyptic narratives fits Brummett’s definition of apocalypse as “unexpected.”  
																																																						
30 David Sanger, 2017. “Talk of ‘Preventive’ War Rises in White House Over North Korea.” 
New York Times.  
31 Brummett, Contemporary Apocalyptic, 25. 
32 Ibid, 24.  
33 Skrimshire, Future Ethics, 40.  
34 Brummett, 6.  
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The entrance of nuclear war into American culture also fundamentally changed what we 
call “the true society.” Although previous wars had their share of casualties and weapons of 
destruction and torture, atomic weapons ushered in an entirely new era of war. Nuclear war 
introduced “death of a new kind, death without warning, death en masse.”35 Boyer argues that 
nuclear war also created the “techno-crat,” an individual skilled with science and technology yet 
oblivious to the larger consequences of actions.36 This is exemplified in everything from burning 
villages in Vietnam to drone strikes today; nuclear weapons encourage cognitive dissonance 
from war. Boyer also uses this term to describe scientists behind the creation of the atom bomb, 
politicians and leaders deliberating about the bomb’s potential uses, and arguably for many 
citizens who have lived under the nuclear threat. It’s clear that nuclear war fits into existing 
definitions of apocalypse. After 1945, American culture suddenly found itself in, and continues 
to find itself in, a time where death en masse is theoretically possible at any moment. As I 
discuss in the next section, this collective fear has caused nuclear alarmism to function as an 
apocalyptic religion in secular society. Nuclear alarmism provides almost a sense of comfort and 
shared community under the proverbial mushroom cloud that Americans found themselves 
under, reassuring fatalists that the apocalypse is fated and out of humanity’s control. 
Fates and Prophecies  
 Before delving into climate change fatalism, the nature of fatalism and human agency 
deserves more exploration. “Fatalism” in its most simple form is “the idea that what happens (or 
has happened) in some sense has to or had to happen”37. Thus, climate change fatalism would be 
the idea that climate change, particularly the feared imminent catastrophic end caused by climate 
																																																						
35 Boyer, From the Bomb’s, 1985, 278.  
36 Ibid, 232.  
37 Solomon, Robert. (2003). “On Fate and Fatalism.” Philosophy East and West, 53(4):435.   
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change, has to happen, and is therefore out of human control. And if climate change truly is 
barreling humanity towards an inescapable end, this fatalistic attitude would have a significant 
impact on perceived human agency in mitigating the negative effects of climate change, and 
cause fewer practical steps to be taken towards curbing global climate change.  
 One of the most common misconceptions about fatalism is that fatalism requires belief 
that a deity is in ultimate control of humanity’s fate. Fatalism does not require belief in either a 
specific theological system or any kind of mysterious agency.38 For example, ideas about fate 
exist in cultures that without bringing up the concept of God. Thus, fatalism does not require a 
religious reading of climate change, and is compatible with a scientific outlook.39 Fatalism is 
different from determinism, which argues that if climate change fatalists were to look at events 
that have happened, they would search for a scientific or causal reason for that event.40 Those 
influenced by determinism would find the most logical conclusion for a catastrophic climate 
change-related event (whether that be God or rising greenhouse gas levels). Using determinism 
could therefore be a practical alternative to climate change fatalism, which will be discussed 
further in the final section of the paper. Fatalism is only concerned with the outcome, not with 
why that outcome happened. This results in feelings of resignation. However, fatalism is often 
tied up with a sense of destiny, in that events are understood to happen within a larger framework 
of meaning.41 This is different than a religious reading of climate change or belief in God 
because destiny can be understood in a completely secular framework. Therefore, fatalism takes 
																																																						
38 Ibid, 435, 439.  
39 Ibid, 437.  
40 Ibid, 435.		
41 Ibid, 439.  
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away perceived human agency in mitigating climate change by reassuring believers in the 
ecological apocalypse that climate change is fated and out of human control.  
Previous research has thoroughly studied the evolution of American pre-millennialism42 
and how this form of Christian apocalypticism causes decreased concern for the negative effects 
of climate change. Although Christian apocalypticism certainly causes climate change fatalism 
among its adherents,43 the type of fatalism referred to in this paper is secular in nature and does 
not require belief in a theological apocalypse or theological system altogether. However, fatalism 
in this paper is also independent of scientific reasons for global climate change. As the following 
study suggests, “climate change fatalism has nothing to do with whether or not an individual 
accepts the facts of climate change.”44 This is because fatalism is not concerned with how or why 
events happen, simply that the outcome is necessary. Again, the “outcome” discussed in this 
paper is the feared catastrophic ending to society caused by global climate change. Although 
many studies concerning Christian apocalypticism and climate change fatalism focus on climate 
change denial, this argument focuses on how climate change alarmism can also lead to inaction 
through the use of secular apocalyptic framing.  
In their study titled “End times theology, the shadow of the future, and public resistance 
to addressing global climate change,” (Barker, D.C & Bearce, D. H) argue that the Christian 
apocalyptic mindset has been transformed into a secular concept that affects attitudes towards 
climate change in those are not biblical literalists. The “American paradox” is the simultaneous 
																																																						
42 Sutton, Mathew A. American Apocalypse: A History of Modern Evangelicalism. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2014.  
43 Jones RP, Cox D and Navarro-Rivera J (2014). 
44 Ibid, 444.  
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acceptance that global warming is true and disinterest in addressing it.45 In 2008, three-fourths of 
Americans believed that there is substantial evidence for global warming, but in the past decade 
little action has been taken on a cultural level.46 Like myself, these researchers predicted that 
Christian apocalyptic beliefs have somehow filtered through secular thought, causing climate 
change fatalism even within a secular mindset. They asked the question, “Does Christian 
eschatology affect public opinion in an appreciable way?” and found that it does affect public 
perceptions of the future.  
The “shadow of the future” is the perceived horizon that players in game theory use to 
make decisions.47 If the player’s shadow of the future is long, individuals will favor long-term 
payoffs and make the appropriate decisions. If the player’s shadow is very short, they will favor 
short term payoffs and make decisions that benefit most the short-term. Belief in the biblical end-
times shortens an individual’s shadow of the future, making individuals more inclined to favor 
short-term payoffs. In their study, although only 16% of respondents believed that the Bible is 
the literal Word of God, 56% believe in the Second Coming of Jesus, showing that end-times 
beliefs influence a wider population than conservative biblical literalists.48 Therefore the 
researchers concluded that yes, Christian eschatology does impact public opinion in a significant 
way. The researchers also argue that perceived time horizons will continue to shorten as time 
goes on, and the spread of these beliefs makes it a non-partisan issue. These results help explain 
why even individuals who acknowledge the reality and severity of climate change are unable to 
																																																						
45 Barker, David C., Bearce, David H. (2012). End-Times “Theology, the Shadow of the Future, 
and Public Resistance to Addressing Global Climate Change.” Political Research Quarterly, 
66(2): 267.   
46 Ibid, 267.		
47 Ibid, 268.  
48 Ibid, 270.		
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favor long-term payoffs that will benefit four of five generations down the road, which in turn 
helps explain how climate change fatalism functions as a secular apocalyptic religion. This study 
also reveals that climate change fatalism is not dependent on also believing in the biblical 
apocalypse. Since many steps to help mitigate the negative effects of climate change require 
long-term foresight, mitigating climate change is often seen as hopeless and futile. This study 
exemplifies how the secular apocalyptic framing used in climate change discourse may initially 
originate from Christian eschatology, yet now influences secular public opinion in a meaningful 
way. However, the “shadow of the future” concept, if applied correctly, may actually be a part of 
the solution to climate change fatalism, as I will discuss in the final part of this paper.  
The phrase was initially coined by Axelrod in 1984 to describe the tendency for humans 
to cooperate in situations where they expect future interactions with the same people.49  Since 
there are social punishments for not cooperating, individuals develop a longer-term perspective, 
and cooperating is encouraged. (Van Lange, P., Klapwijk, A & Van Munster, L. 2011) found that 
people who are self-interested “are more likely to cooperate when they realize it’s in their long-
term interest to do so.”50 In this way, shadow of the future may actually be part of the solution to 
discouraging climate change fatalism. By lengthening an individual’s perceived shadow of time 
and lengthening the perceived social contract one has with his or her community, cooperation in 
mitigating climate change may be encouraged. One dissenting opinion comes from (McBride, M. 
& Skaperdas, S., 2014), who argue that a longer shadow of the future encourages conflict, which 
would be problematic in the possible case of resource shortages due to climate change.51 This is 
																																																						
49 Axelrod, Robert M. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books: 1984.  
50 Van Lange, P. Klapwijk, A. Van Munster, L. (2011). “How shadow of the future might 
promote cooperation.” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 14(6): 857-870, 860. 
51 McBride, M. Skaperdas, S. (2014). “Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future.” 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 105: 75-89, 87.  
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due to the unfortunate truth that conflict becomes more likely if one’s adversary has a greater 
long-term payoff than oneself.52 Thus, in a potential future where resources become scarce 
enough to cause interstate conflict, having a longer shadow of the future may in turn make a 
country more desperate to go to war to gather resources for a longer time frame. However, the 
shadow of the future is a complex theory used both in game theory and sociology, and its’ 
potential for encouraging cooperation in mitigating the negative effects of climate change should 
be investigated further.  
Climate change fatalism puts society in a much different situation than if determinism 
predominated. As I will expand upon in the final section of this paper, determinism would reach 
for reasons and causes of climate change catastrophes, whereas fatalism is simply concerned 
with the fact that they must happen. Therefore, the answer to climate change fatalism is not more 
education about the facts of climate change. Individual attitudes towards climate change are 
often unaffected by increased awareness about its scientific validity because fatalism is 
independent of reasons. Although fatalism is not religious and can co-exist in a scientific 
worldview, science very well may not be the answer to curbing fatalistic attitudes towards 
climate change. Unlike determinism, which is “very dependent on scientific reasons of why and 
how,” fatalism is its own how and why; it’s seeing climate change catastrophes and saying they 
happened “because I told you so.”53 
Why does climate change trigger fatalism? Fatalism is inherent in both nuclear alarmism 
and climate change alarmism since it stems from apocalyptic framing of these global risks. Per 
Espen Stoknes identifies 5 psychological barriers in his book What We Think About When We 
																																																						
52 Ibid, 77.		
53 Solomon, Robert. (2003). “On Fate and Fatalism.” Philosophy East and West, 53(4), 447.  
	
	
20	
Try Not to Think About Climate Change that help explain why fatalism is such a knee-jerk 
reaction to climate change. The 5 “D’s” of climate change are: Distance, doom, dissonance, 
denial, and identity.54 First, the negative effects of climate change are all relatively distant from 
most individuals. The negative effects of pumping gasoline into a car today won’t be seen until 
someone’s grandchildren are alive. Secondly, the scare tactics used when addressing climate 
change do little more than frighten and discourage action. The emotional dissonance associated 
with climate change, as exemplified in a shortened shadow of the future in the previous study, 
makes it difficult to assign blame or control, causing denial. Finally, the now unavoidable reality 
of climate change affects most parts of our identity as an individual living in Western society: 
religion, politics, economics, the fate of humanity as a species. All of these factor into fatalistic 
attitudes towards climate change. Climate change is “utterly intangible, unreal and real at the 
same time.”55 Most relevant to fatalism, climate change presents an uncertain future. Stoknes 
argues that as a species we are obsessed with control and certainty, and we often reach to assign 
whatever meaning we can to an uncertain situation. This includes connecting climate change 
alarmism to a cataclysmic environmental apocalypse.  
Even if fatalism does not require belief in a deity or religious system, or demands reasons 
for events, it does insinuate that events like environmental catastrophes happen for a larger 
purpose. Thus, “The fatalist is interested in the significance of what happens, and that means 
fitting it into a narrative that makes sense of our lives.”56 This means regardless of the 
anthropocentric nature of climate change, an impending environmental apocalypse is seen to 
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have greater meaning in the fate of humanity. Another paradox that persists in climate change 
denial is that although it is widely known that human activity contributes to increased 
greenhouse gases, increased catastrophic weather is still perceived as divine in origin.57 This 
seems almost backwards: that natural disasters are more likely attributed to notions of God or 
fate instead of scientifically proven rising temperatures in a sophisticated society does not sit 
well. However, this is part of the nature of fatalism. Even in sophisticated societies, fatalism is 
able to flourish because it rebels against intellectualism.58 This is especially true in cases where 
intellectualism seems to have failed to solve societal problems, or even make society worse. The 
development of nuclear weapons is one cited example of how intellectualism may have created 
our own demise, which will be discussed at length in this paper. In the same way, the predicted 
environmental apocalypse was created by the very technology that helped Western society 
advance: industrialization, fossil fuel engineering, etc. Because technology and rationality 
created the doomsday in the first place, individuals who acknowledge anthropogenic climate 
change gravitate towards fatalism; not because it provides any solutions or even any reasons for 
why the doomsday is coming, but perhaps for the simple comfort of knowing that fate is out of 
humanity’s control. Fatalism ironically gives catastrophic events a greater meaning, and absolves 
people of guilt or responsibility for climate change.  
Fatalism discourages human agency in mitigating climate change on two fronts: first by 
arguing that a catastrophic ecological apocalypse would be inevitable and is imbued with a 
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higher meaning for humanity, and second by insinuating that humans are not guilty for climate 
change, and therefore not obligated to mitigate it. (Foust, C. & Murphy, W. 2009) agree with 
(Barker & Bearce 2013) that having a shorter perceived time frame for the world would 
discourage individuals from believing they have agency in mitigating climate change.59 
Apocalyptic framing of global climate change encourages fatalism because apocalyptic belief, 
like fatalism, is rooted in predictions and prophecies, and more often than not leaves humanity 
out of the decision-making process.60 Apocalyptic framing also, “makes it difficult to hold 
humans accountable for pumping greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.”61 If a catastrophic 
environmental apocalypse is out of human control, then climate change itself is no longer 
anthropogenic. Furthermore, (Keller, 1999) argues that “Trying to stay responsible to the 
complex and often terrifying interdependencies constituting the planetary whole often backfires: 
panic renders us non-response-able.”62 Panic, fueled by uncertainty, causes fatalism by making it 
seem impossible for individuals to respond to the gravity of climate change, making us non-
response-able, and non-responsible for climate change.  Barry Brummett in his book 
Contemporary Apocalyptic Rhetoric explains that believers (in any apocalypse, religious or 
environmental) are “reassured, not by regaining control” and that “rather than encouraging 
material action or behavioral change, being a true believer resigns the community to inaction.”63 
Fatalism encourages believers in the ecological apocalypse that catastrophic weather has higher 
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meaning, that the causes for it do not matter, and that the proper response is continued inaction. 
Climate change fatalism is articulated through apocalyptic narratives, which perpetuate a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
Climate change fatalism ultimately leaves many in Western society in a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: believing a catastrophic environmental apocalypse is unavoidable, fated even, and 
therefore little to no action is taken to mitigate it. The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy was first 
articulated by American sociologist W. I. Thomas who wrote “If men define situations as real, 
they are real in their consequences.”64 Thomas’ theorem was then popularized by Robert Merton 
who in 1948 attempted to use the theorem to tackle racial tensions in the United States. He 
defined a self-fulfilling prophecy as, “a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior 
which makes the originally false conception come true.”65 In the case of climate change, the 
false definition would be something along the lines of, “the negative effects of climate change 
will cause an unavoidable ecological apocalypse and humanity is powerless to stop it.” As a 
consequence, little to no action is taken on an individual level to help mitigate the negative 
effects of climate change. Self-fulfilling prophecies are similar to fatalism because they both 
argue that humanity responds to more than the objective facts of a situation, but the meaning of 
the situation; at times, only to the meaning of the situation. 66 Merton argues that breaking the 
cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies is incredibly difficult and not a simple act of will: “The will 
cannot be turned on and off like a faucet.”67 He argues that the way to break the cycle is to 
replace the initial false assumption about the situation with a new one. In the case of climate 
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change, that would mean replacing assumptions that climate change is tragically doomed to an 
apocalypse to optimistic attitudes that there is still time, and that individual actions do matter. 
Merton agrees, however, that education campaigns are not the cure-all for social 
problems in America.68 He acknowledges that social intelligence itself is a “product of distinct 
social forces” and for the problem he was tackling, racism in 1948, education campaigns would 
end up being biased.69 Similarly, it can be argued that education campaigns to encourage actions 
to mitigate climate change have been relatively unsuccessful. Stoknes argues that “conventional 
climate communications have triggered more distancing, not increased concern and priority.”70 
Although mitigating climate change does require urgency and potential consequences of not 
addressing climate change could potentially be catastrophic, using apocalyptic narratives or scare 
tactics encourages the current fatalistic self-fulfilling prophecy. When climate change campaigns 
are overly frightening, this only encourages the original false assumption that mitigating climate 
change is beyond humanity’s control. This tendency to relate to ecological apocalypse using fate 
and prophecies is one way that climate change fatalism functions as an apocalyptic religion in 
secular society. Although fatalism does not require belief in a God or theological system, climate 
change fatalism does insinuate that an ecological apocalypse is imminent, and that it carries 
meaning for humanity as a whole. One influencer of climate change fatalism is the constant 
threat of nuclear war, which is also itself imbued with fatalism and apocalyptic narrative. 
Discourse on nuclear winter influenced emerging discussions of global climate change to also be 
framed as an imminent apocalypse. However, the two threats are very different and the 
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potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change will not be felt until generations down 
the road, whereas nuclear winter could theoretically occur at any moment. Next I will discuss 
how nuclear war became connected with the environment, and how this encouraged climate 
change to be framed as an imminent apocalypse.  
Enter the Wasteland  
 The threat of nuclear war is permanently connected to the threat of ecological 
catastrophe. Although there are many other factors that influence global climate change like 
vehicle emissions, factory emissions, and methane emissions from mass meat farming, nuclear 
war and anthropogenic climate change share a unique relationship in that they both emerged in 
public discourse around the same time, and both use apocalyptic framing. The term “nuclear 
winter” was coined in 1983 by Richard Turco, one of a team of scientists that spent the decade 
studying the potential effects of nuclear fallout on the environment.71 Nuclear “winter” was used 
in their articles instead of nuclear “war” or “weapons” to avoid political friction. Nevertheless, 
the term solidified for the first time the relationship between climate change and nuclear 
weapons, “linking pressing Cold War issues to worries about the planet’s environmental 
future.”72 “Nuclear winter” is defined as “worldwide climatic cooling from stratospheric smoke” 
caused by the use of nuclear weapons, but the term is often used to describe any and all aspects 
of the “wasteland” that would be left after a global nuclear war.73 This apocalyptic framing of 
nuclear winter influenced emerging discourse on global climate change to also be framed as 
catastrophic.  
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 One reason why nuclear fears influence anthropogenic climate change to be framed as an 
apocalypse is because the potential environmental consequences of a nuclear war are themselves 
catastrophic, and these consequences could theoretically happen at any moment. The potential 
consequences of nuclear war were studied as early as the observation of black rain after the 
bombing of Hiroshima.74 However, these early studies were conducted in secrecy. For example, 
Harry Wexler, director of research at the U.S. Weather Bureau at the time, studied the effects of 
nuclear dust under the guise of studying volcanic ash in Project Gabriel.75 The political 
atmosphere during the Cold War made studying the negative effects of nuclear weapons taboo, 
although the fear of a potential nuclear wasteland was being articulated in mass media at the 
time. Another covert project, Starfish Prime, exemplifies the catastrophic fears associated with 
nuclear war in the decades following their first use in WWII. In 1962, a thermonuclear bomb 
dubbed “Starfish Prime” was detonated 250 miles above the Pacific Ocean, one of five nuclear 
tests done in space. The bomb created an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) much larger than 
expected, making it impossible to gather data from the explosion. The EMP also knocked out 
over 300 streetlights in Hawaii, which was over 900 miles away.76 During this period of nuclear 
testing, it was not uncommon for nuclear bombs to have unexpected consequences after 
detonation, further deepening the fear of “human self-destruction” that emerged after 1945.77 The 
potential impact of just one nuclear weapon is devastating, and the combination of tens or 
hundreds would be nothing short of apocalyptic. 
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 Although scientists started examining the environmental consequences of nuclear war 
almost immediately after the 1945 bombings (in all fairness, the devastation in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki could not be easily ignored), no studies were done on the psychological impact of 
nuclear war until 17 years afterward.78 Although other major catastrophic events like severe 
weather, earthquakes, and warfare before the development of nuclear weapons cause their own 
kind of trauma, nuclear weaponry creates a collective psychosis that is unique to the modern age. 
Compared to other global catastrophic risks, nuclear winter could occur quicker, at any time, and 
would devastate a larger portion of the planet.79 These factors combined cause lethargy and 
apathy in people who are aware of the potential for nuclear winter, which is arguably most 
people living in the United States and in other countries that hold nuclear weapons. Although it 
would be nearly impossible to study the psychological effects of nuclear war as it effects entire 
nations and cultures, it has been studied in contained instances, such as case studies of Hirohima 
and Nagasaki victims and the Three Mile Island nuclear accident.  
 Although victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not studied until almost two decades 
after 1945, researchers were able to identify clear signs of sustained psychological trauma that 
persisted after the event. Even long after the bombings, disaster victims are “apathetic, docile, 
indecisive, unemotional, and they behave mechanically.”80 Thompson also describes how apathy 
provides comfort to disaster victims as a form of “wishful fantasy.”81 Apathy prevents victims 
from confronting personal tragedy, avoiding further psychological stress. Although it is 
impossible to compare actual victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to everyday Americans who 
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only perceive nuclear war as a threat, these case studies provide an example of the kind of 
psychological stress it can cause.  
The Three Mile Island accident provides an example of how quickly “victims,” or those 
who lived near enough to the accident to be personally impacted by the event, resorted to apathy 
and fatalism even though there was no serious physical destruction. The 2 million people who 
lived in surrounding areas received 1 millirem of radiation, and the average chest X-ray exposes 
individuals to 6 millirem of radiation.82 However, the event was perceived as catastrophic, and 
during the meltdown people who lived within 5 miles of the reactor felt demoralized, helpless, 
and depressed.83 Furthermore, 25% of this study’s respondents still felt seriously threatened by 
the reactor 4 months after the accident, and the surrounding community was still living in fear of 
“a danger they could not see, hear, or feel.”84 Although the Three Mile Island accident was not a 
threat of nuclear war, fear of the unknown still caused serious feelings of apathy and 
helplessness. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons carry an inherent fear of the unknown and 
fear of self-destruction. The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 was the closest serious threat of 
nuclear destruction since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the accident permanently 
damaged American ideals of nuclear technology as a safe, unlimited source of energy. One could 
say that the visceral fear felt by many living states away from Pennsylvania during the accident 
made everyone a victim of the psychological effects of nuclear power.  
This fear of radiation, of a danger that can not be seen, heard, or felt, causes apathy and 
fatalism even in people who are not directly impacted by nuclear power themselves, because 
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nuclear war could theoretically happen at any time to anyone. Nuclear fears are easily triggered 
and not easily forgotten. Feelings of apathy and lethargy lead to fatalism by reinforcing the belief 
that individuals are incapable of preventing nuclear destruction, and are therefore at the mercy of 
an unseen and unheard danger. Fatalism takes agency away from individuals, which both causes 
further feelings of helplessness, yet absolves individuals of responsibility in dealing with major 
dilemmas like nuclear power. As with Hiroshima and Nagasaki victims, apathy reassures that “If 
I don’t react, then nothing has happened.”85 Apathy, fatalism, and the consequential inaction then 
impacts citizen voting and policy decisions surrounding nuclear power.  
The intense fear and consequential apathy caused by nuclear power impacts policy 
decisions, which Thompson explains using group think. Coined in 1972 by Irving Janis, group 
think occurs when “a group makes faulty decisions because group pressures lead to a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.”86 Nuclear fatalism 
causes symptoms similar to group think since nuclear fatalism is felt on a cultural level in the 
United States, and discourages nuclear disarmament policy. One symptom of group think is an 
illusion of invulnerability, and is prominent in nuclear fatalism. Since nuclear weaponry 
immediately made almost everyone in the United States feel vulnerable to destruction, fatalism 
fills in this gap by creating an illusion of invulnerability. Fatalism takes away individual agency 
and therefore individual responsibility, creating the illusion that nuclear war is “not my 
problem.” This cognitive dissonance then gets transferred to the voting booth, helping explain 
why strong opposition to nuclear arms is historically sporadic and short-lived. The psychological 
effects of nuclear war are felt by victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those affected by the Three 
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Mile Island accident, and by Americans nationwide who are forced to grapple with the 
destructive potential that nuclear power holds whenever nuclear tensions arise. However, since 
nuclear power carries an inherent fear of the unknown, it causes fatalism which functions similar 
to apocalyptic religion by filling in the gaps with a greater meaning and an ontology. When 
discussions of nuclear winter and anthropogenic climate change surfaced in the late 1970’s and 
on, symptoms of fatalism and group think were already in play, and both global risks were 
framed apocalyptically.  
 It was not until 1975 that the environmental impact of nuclear weapons were studied in 
the open,87 and many organizations in the 1980’s agreed that nuclear winter is a real visceral 
threat to human civilization.88 Turco admits in the 2008 article, “Environmental consequences of 
nuclear war,” that many predictions made about nuclear winter in the 1980’s were 
underestimates at best.89 Advanced climate change models used in recent studies suggest that a 
very minimal number of nuclear weapons is needed to cause a nuclear winter. Unlike studies in 
the 1980’s, which neglected to include the potential damage caused by firestorms after a nuclear 
strike, (Toon, Owen, Robock & Turco, 2008) found that the potential aftereffects of a nuclear 
war could be more devastating than the initial bombs: the indirect effects of nuclear winter 
(agricultural collapse, reduced precipitation, winter-like temperatures) could result in the loss of 
one to several billion humans, not including those who perish in the bomb explosion.90 Their 
article simulates a potential nuclear war under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(SORT), also known as the Treaty of Moscow, which was ratified in 2002 to reduce the number 
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of active warheads in the United States and Russia to 1,700-2,200 each by 2012.91 Although their 
study showed that this goal still allowed potential for a nuclear winter, having a total of 4,400 
nuclear warheads between the two countries would be 6% of the active warheads that existed in 
1986. This treaty was replaced with the New START treaty in 2010, with the goal to reduce 
warheads in both countries to 1,550. However, Turco’s article shows that a mere few hundred 
nuclear warheads exploded in urban areas would be capable of producing a nuclear winter. 
Under SORT, 4,400 nuclear explosions with 100 kiloton weapons would cause 770 million 
casualties and 180 trillion grams (Tg) of soot in the atmosphere. For reference, a mere 5 Tg of 
soot could produce the lowest temperatures on Earth in over a thousand years, and 75 Tg of soot 
would cause temperatures not seen since the last Ice Age, and cause global precipitation to 
decrease by 25%.92 A single United States submarine carrying 144 warheads could generate 23 
Tg of soot if those explosions hit an urban area, effectively showing that a single U.S. submarine 
is capable of producing a nuclear winter.  
 These findings are significant because they show just how devastating even a small 
number of nuclear weapons would be for the environment. Thus, nuclear weapons are 
permanently tied to discussions about the environment and anthropogenic global climate change, 
and since 1982 “the global consequences of nuclear war became part of the Washington political 
scenery.”93 Furthermore, the potentially catastrophic consequences of a global nuclear war 
encourage fatalism. Seth Baum states in his article “Confronting the threat of nuclear winter” 
that, “As with other global catastrophic risks, nuclear winter might superficially seem like such a 
big issue that only a select few of the elite insider scientists and policy makers can make a 
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difference on it.”94 The threat of nuclear winter offers perhaps even less hope for individual 
agency than mitigating climate change, causing feelings of hopelessness or even apathy when 
faced when the potential for nuclear winter. It is my argument that this fatalistic and apathetic 
attitude towards nuclear winter influenced many to adopt a similar attitude when faced with the 
threats associated with global climate change. Although other global catastrophic risks can cause 
fatalistic attitudes, nuclear winter is unique among them because it can occur quickly and at any 
time.95 The imminent and catastrophic framing of nuclear winter then influenced the global 
climate change discourse that emerged soon after.  
The connection between the threats of nuclear winter and climate change is unique 
because they emerged in public discourse around the same time: “Nuclear winter and 
anthropogenic climate change (through either nuclear weapons, cooling from dust, or heating 
from production of carbon dioxide) emerged together as exciting and contested focal points.”96 
The very term itself,  “nuclear winter” suggests that nuclear war has a deep impact on the 
environment. For this reason, nuclear winter discourse and climate change discourse are not 
easily separated. Nuclear winter could cause an ecological catastrophe, leading to climate change 
being framed with a similar potential catastrophic end to civilization. This is significant because 
nuclear war and anthropogenic global climate change are not the same, do not have the same 
consequences, and should not carry the same apocalyptic fears. Although both nuclear winter 
and the negative effects of climate change offer potentially catastrophic futures for human 
civilization, a global nuclear war could happen at any moment and relatively quickly, as Dorries 
suggests earlier. The negative effects of climate change are just now starting to manifest, and the 
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consequences of our actions today will not be felt until generations later. Dorries argues that 
“nuclear winter and the debate around it foreshadowed and structured the subsequent focus on 
anthropogenic climate change.”97 The debates surrounding nuclear winter passed on apocalyptic 
framing to the subsequent discourse about global climate change. Although a sense of urgency is 
needed on a wide scale to mitigate the negative effects of climate change, the apocalyptic 
mindset many climate change alarmists have now only causes fatalistic attitudes and lethargy.  
Thus, climate change fatalism adopts apocalyptic framing, and like nuclear war, emerged from 
the secular apocalyptic and carries an imminent eschatology like an apocalyptic religion. Now, 
climate change alarmists warn of an impending ecological catastrophe, and this apocalyptic 
discourse in turn causes climate change fatalism. In this way, climate change fatalism has a 
complex relationship with the apocalyptic, since they interact in a cyclical way: first, climate 
change has historically adopted apocalyptic framing, and second, apocalyptic discourse causes 
climate change fatalism. Thus, climate change fatalism embodies a self-fulfilling—and self-
defeating—prophecy that discourages individual mitigation.  
Throughout the past several decades of climate change discourse, contemporary 
environmentalism has warned of an impending ecological apocalypse.98 Even before the rise of 
global climate change discourse in the 1980’s, “eco-dystopic” fiction emerged as a genre.99 In 
the 1950’s, eco-dystopias like Wyndham’s The Day of the Triffids and Christopher’s Death of 
Grass emerged. Note that these dystopian narratives started forming after the start of the Nuclear 
Age. (McNeish, 2017) argues that “dystopia has replaced utopia as the dominant mode of 
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speculative cultural imagination,” confirming that the ecological apocalyptic emerged out of the 
secular apocalyptic.100 Again, the secular apocalyptic argues that humanity has created its own 
downfall despite being technologically advanced, creating a paradox and a dystopian mindset, 
one that now influences climate change discourse still today. McNeish also confirms that the 
ecological apocalyptic is not dependent on religious apocalyptic beliefs: “The apocalyptic 
encompasses a broad range of beliefs, actions, and social processes centered on cultural 
disjunctures concerned with ‘the end of the world’ and thereafter.”101 The secular apocalyptic 
mindset that emerged after the creation and proliferation of nuclear weapons has significantly 
influenced climate change discourse since the 1950’s, and particularly in the 1980’s, causing it to 
be framed as an imminent catastrophe. Apocalyptic framing of climate change has been 
thoroughly studied and critiqued since then, and it has been concluded that it discourages 
mitigation by creating a fatalistic mindset. 
 Both McNeish and Hulme argue that Cold War fears were of nuclear winter were 
replaced by climate change fears.102 Especially after the Berlin Wall fell, it became popular 
opinion in the scientific community that the negative effects of global climate change were now 
the “most important apocalyptic threat to Earth’s life sustaining ecosystems.”103 Since the very 
visceral and catastrophic threat of nuclear winter was also based on a cultural relationship to the 
environment, climate change discourse also naturally gravitated towards the catastrophic. Mike 
Hulme seconds this argument that the current climate change discourse, “constructed around 
looming and apocalyptic changes in future climate, finds resonsance throughout the past,” and 
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that, “humans have always been capable of constructing narratives of fear around their direct or 
vicarious experiences of ‘strange’, unknown, or portended climates.”104 Hulme identifies three 
distinct ways that human culture often relates to strange climates: climate as judgment, climate 
as pathology, and climate as catastrophe, the most latter being the center of discussion for this 
paper.105 Although there are many other responses to global climate change besides 
apocalyptically-framed fatalism, Hulme argues that humans are naturally afraid of strange and 
changing environments, and the functionalist perspective of religion argues that one function of 
religion is assigning meaning to chaos. Therefore, it should not be unexpected that climate 
change is framed as an imminent apocalypse. Apocalyptic framing of climate change minimizes 
human agency, furthering a cycle of inaction and an incorrect attitude that climate change is 
fated and cannot be mitigated.  
 One example of the dangers of ecological apocalyptic framing is seen through the movie 
The Day After Tomorrow. The 2004 film has been thoroughly studied to see if it has had any 
significant impact on popular opinion concerning climate change, especially since the makers of 
the film publicly acknowledged their belief that the film could potentially address climate 
change.106 The article “Does tomorrow ever come?” is one such study which gathered empirical 
evidence that any potential benefits of the eco-dystopic film were short-lived. (Lowe et. al., 
2006) used surveys as participants left the theater after seeing the film to assess initial reactions, 
and followed-up with focus groups a month later to see if the film had any lasting effects. 
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Immediately after viewing the film, 44% of respondents said they would try to do more to 
mitigate the negative effects of climate change; however, focus groups one month later revealed 
that daily tasks quickly overtook that concern.107 Furthermore, one respondent compared the 
experience to watching the zombie film 28 Days Later: although one might start thinking about 
how they would prepare for a zombie apocalypse, those ideas are not taken seriously.108 This 
confirms that the movie The Day After Tomorrow was still overall perceived as a fictional 
Hollywood film. The researchers also found that a significant number of respondents reported 
that they were confused about the realistic possibility of the events in the movie, and may have 
taken the message more seriously if the film had been produced or backed by legitimate 
scientific organizations.109 The movie also caused some positive responses, such as the potential 
for humans to adapt to extreme situations, and that respondents were reassured that future 
generations will be more prepared to cope with the kind of negative effects of climate change 
depicted in the film.110 This study reveals that although the film initially caused a sense of 
urgency, that sense was quickly lost in the tide of everyday life, coupled with the sense that the 
movie was little more than a dramatized Hollywood film. The apocalyptic framing used in The 
Day After Tomorrow was not successful in encouraging a sense of agency in mitigating global 
climate change, and may have even dramatized the dangers of climate change to a point where 
they are no longer taken seriously, thus confirming Moo’s argument that, “Apocalypse can easily 
become merely another form of entertainment…hence even more deadened to the significance of 
present life.”111 
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 Apocalyptic narratives have also been critiqued for their unnecessary victimization of 
“climate refugees,” or those who are forced to migrate due to the negative effects of climate 
change, such as flooding or loss of arable land. Although (Bettini, 2013) agrees that the potential 
effects of climate change induced migration could be catastrophic “with epochal impacts on 
human societies,” an apocalyptic framing radically changes the meaning of climate change 
induced migration.112 Apocalypticism paints climate refugees as unavoidable, and draws a line 
between the “normal” present and “post-apocalyptic” after.113 This sense that mass amounts of 
climate change induced migration can cause a fatalistic mindset towards helping even current 
climate refugees. These apocalyptic narratives may even feed restrictive immigration policies 
and xenophobic attitudes towards refugees.114 These two examples, one from popular culture and 
one concerning climate refugees, reveals that apocalyptic framing does not effectively encourage 
the public to mitigate the negative effects of global climate change.  
These studies also confirm McNeish’s argument that “Apocalypticism is viewed as 
counterproductive because it encourages fatalistic attitudes among publics with detract from 
political agency.”115 Climate change fatalism is heavily influenced by the secular apocalyptic. 
The, “subliminal, not quite conscious, collectively carried apocalyptic habits are pervasive; and 
they are not conducive to long-term and sustainable life on this planet.”116 Furthermore, Hulme 
argues that “The alarmist repertoire uses an inflated language, with terms such as catastrophe, 
chaos, and havoc, and its tone is often urgent. It employs a quasi-religious register of doom, 
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death, judgments, heaven and hell,” confirming that climate change fatalism functions as a 
secular apocalyptic religion.117 The “alarmist repertoire” can be interpreted as a religious 
discourse, and fatalism itself as a form of practice.  
Although nuclear war and global climate change both fit the definition of an apocalypse, 
they are secular phenomena and do not exactly fit into traditional ideas of religion like 
Christianity. However, certain perspectives in Religious Studies acknowledge that some 
phenomena that are not traditional religion can still function similarly. Capitalism/consumerism 
is one example often cited. The functionalist perspective of religion is important to study next 
because it will then be used throughout the argument to classify climate change fatalism as a 
religion.  
The Functionalist Theory of Religion  
The functionalist theory of religion was initially developed by sociologist Emile 
Durkheim, and defines five basic functions of religion: (a) giving meaning and purpose to life, 
(b) reinforcing social unity, (c) serving as an agent of social control, (d) promoting physical and 
psychological well-being, and (e) motivating people to work for change.118 In summary, religion 
serves to provide meaning to apparently meaningless situations, and order to a chaotic and 
unpredictable existence. Both the development of nuclear war and the potential negative 
consequences of climate change threatens our sense of purpose, brings only more chaos, and 
jeopardizes life on the planet itself. Clinging to fatalistic attitudes provides at least some sense of 
stability to those grappling with the fear of atomic annihilation or ecological catastrophe, even if 
that stability is dependent on an imminent apocalypse. Believing in an impending atomic or 
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ecological apocalypse is almost more comforting than pure uncertainty about the future. David 
Loy has already argued that other secular phenomena, specifically the market capitalist system, 
can be considered a religion under the functionalist theory.  
David R. Loy’s article “The Religion of the Market” exemplifies how secular systems 
functioning similar to religion have become incredibly influential in Western society today. The 
functionalist view of religion is still applicable, if not perhaps more applicable, today because the 
theory offers to “show us what the world is, and what our role in that world is.”119 Although for 
the majority of the article, Loy is arguing that the capitalist economic system is a world religion, 
he acknowledges the unique dilemma that “our time of ecological catastrophe” presents: “for 
ecological catastrophe is awakening us not only to the fact that we need a deeper source of 
values and meaning than market capitalism can provide, but to the realization that contemporary 
religion is not meeting this need either.”120 One of the reasons the secular apocalyptic has 
proliferated since WWII is because secular “religions” like the religion of the market have 
slowly been replacing traditional religion. Loy exemplifies the shift towards the secular Taylor 
describes in his Malaise of Modernity: the “religion of the market” is one way that humanity 
replaces God in the secular apocalyptic. Accordingly, Loy argues that the answer to avoiding the 
potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change is not a return to traditional religion. 
However, as will be discussed in the final section of this paper, the redemptive and hopeful 
aspects of apocalyptic religion could be used as motivation for mitigating climate change.  
From the functionalist theory of religion, Loy draws the following argument for market 
capitalism as a religion, which can also be applied to nuclear and climate change fatalism: “it is a 
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worldview, with an ontology and ethics, in competition with other understandings of what the 
world is and how we should live in it.”121 Apocalyptic religions regularly compete with other 
understandings of the world, even within the same religion. Nuclear fears feed into climate 
change fatalism, creating apocalyptic narratives and lethargy in mitigating climate change. This 
is similar to how Loy argues that the religion of the market relies on the justification that 
capitalism is the natural way of being, and the only right way of being. Loy’s argues that 
capitalism does not bring its’ adherents true joy; the same can be said for climate change fatalism 
as an apocalyptic religion. Weber’s sociology of religion theory states that religious adherents, 
“do not enjoy inner repose because they are in the grip of inner tensions.”122 Living under 
constant threat of nuclear war, coupled with the crippling fear that resources will run dry, sea 
levels will rise, and severe weather will increase, the secular apocalyptic becomes appealing not 
because it offers any repose, but because it restores meaning and higher purpose to a situation in 
which many feels powerless. In this way, the secular apocalyptic mindset associated with climate 
change fatalism functions as a religion in American society.  
One problematic aspect of Loy’s argument is the very coining of the term “ecological 
catastrophe.” Loy himself uses the apocalyptic framing that encourages climate change fatalism, 
again revealing how pervasive apocalyptic framing is when talking about the negative effects of 
climate change.  Once again, this demonstrates the “malaise of modernity,” the secular 
apocalyptic, and the dystopian mindset that underlies much of the current climate change 
discourse. If dystopia means “liv[ing] in a universe where we are in charge, [yet] all we can see 
on the horizon is our end,” as Joustra describes, Loy exemplifies that paradox.123 Although he 
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points out the flaws of market capitalism and the secular religion it functions as in order to 
encourage a more mindful, eco-centric approach to the economy, describing climate change in 
the terms of ecological catastrophe further embodies the secular apocalyptic. Although using 
apocalyptic framing does not undo the argument Loy is making in any way, it does further 
encourage climate change fatalism.  
Before discussing nuclear winter and climate change fatalism, it will be important to 
understand how fatalism works and why it discourages mitigating climate change. Fatalism is a 
vital factor in this argument, since it is responsible for stripping away human agency in the 
secular apocalyptic. Both fatalism and the apocalyptic rely on fear of the unknown, which is why 
the two concepts compliment each other so well. The next section of the paper will go into detail 
explaining how climate change fatalism fits the functionalist definition of a religion.  
Fatalism and Functionalism 
 This paper approaches the concept of apocalypse in two distinct ways. The first, which 
has hopefully become clear, is how the secular apocalyptic rose and proliferated throughout 
American culture with the development of nuclear weapons. Then, since nuclear weapons could 
cause a very real apocalypse, budding discourse about global anthropogenic climate change also 
adopted an apocalyptic frame, one that has caused climate change fatalism and discourages 
mitigation. The second way this paper approaches the apocalyptic is by arguing that climate 
change fatalism itself functions as a religion, one that is secular in nature similar to Loy’s 
“Religion of the Market.” Since the religion is secular, it impacts the majority of the population, 
not only those who believe in the biblical Apocalypse, causing an alarmism that is pervasive and 
paralyzing for many Americans who acknowledge that climate change is a serious threat to the 
planet.  
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 In the beginning of his book Holy Terrors, Bruce Lincoln approaches the subject of 
defining religion before delving into the complicated relationship between religion and the 
September 11th World Trade Center attack, and it is his definition of religion that I draw on to 
define climate change fatalism as a secular apocalyptic religion. First and foremost, climate 
change fatalism operates similar to an apocalyptic religion because it presents an imminent 
eschatology. Much of the current climate change discourse uses scare tactics to inspire 
mitigation, including warnings of an impending catastrophic end to civilization caused by 
climate change. This ecological apocalypse is similar to the biblical Apocalypse because it 
fulfills a judgment of humanity’s sin (using too many resources, polluting the earth and 
atmosphere) and results in a return to Eden. Humans will either no longer exist and nature will be 
allowed once again to grow freely, or will be forced to start civilization from scratch, hopefully 
learning to exist more in harmony with nature the next time around. The fact that climate change 
has been framed apocalyptically has been thoroughly studied already, but the argument that 
climate change fatalism functions itself as an entirely distinct secular apocalyptic religion will be 
harder to prove, and will rely on Lincoln’s interpretation of the functionalist theory of religion.  
 Lincoln begins by critiquing Clifford Greetz’s definition of religion, one that an entire 
generation of Religious Studies students was trained to know by heart: “a religion is (i) a system 
of symbols which acts to (ii) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by (iii) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (iv) 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (v) the moods and motivations 
seem uniquely realistic.”124 This definition of religion emphasizes ontology, or the system of 
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meaning that a religion gives human existence, as well as most interior aspects of religion, such 
as “moods and motivations.” However, Lincoln points out that this traditional definition neglects 
other aspects of religion, namely practice, discipline, and community.125 Religion is clearly not 
only an interior matter and not merely a metaphysical phenomenon. Religion affects nearly all 
aspects of a society and its various communities, so Lincoln appeals to Durkheim. Lincoln states 
that “religious subjects are bound in moral communities that enjoy their allegiance and serve as a 
base of their identity.”126 Lincoln leans more towards the communal and institutional sides of 
religion. Although it can be dangerous to cast a wide net for what can be called a “religion,” the 
rise of modernity and the secular apocalyptic calls for a different set of values that constitute a 
religion, or else we would not be able to diagnose quasi-religious phenomena like capitalism as a 
religion like Loy successfully did.  
 Thus, Lincoln argues that a religion must minimally have the four following qualifiers: 
(1) A discourse whose concerns transcend the human, temporal, and contingent, and that claims 
for itself a similarly transcendent status, (2) A set of practices whose goal is to produce a proper 
world and/or proper human subjects, as defined by a religious discourse to which these practices 
are connected, (3) A community whose members construct their identity with reference to a 
religious discourse and its attendant practices, and (4) an institution that regulates religious 
discourse, practices, and community, reproducing them over time and modifying them as 
necessary.127 One of the most unique aspects of this definition is that each qualifier builds off the 
previous one, ultimately resulting in an institution that continually reaffirms a system of doctrine, 
practices, and community. These qualifiers beg the question, “What does climate change fatalism 
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offer as a religion?” and it can be argued that climate change fatalism has each of Lincoln’s 
progressive qualifiers.  
 The first qualifier for a religion is discourse, but not just any discourse. Lincoln argues 
that for discourse to become religious, it must claim transcendental authority, and that religious 
discourse is distinguished by its “capacity to frame the way any content will be received and 
regarded.”128 Climate change discourse has been framed time and again as apocalyptic, instantly 
claiming a transcendental authority. Alarmist discourse on climate change that warns of an 
impending ecological catastrophe leaves room to be interpreted, “but never ignored or rejected,” 
as Lincoln argues is necessary for discourse to become religious.129 Furthermore, major 
environmental groups like Greenpeace using framing techniques to couple a sense of urgency 
and doom with images of starving polar bears, for example. Climate change fatalism has the 
capacity to frame how individuals will interpret information regarding climate change, whether it 
be statistics, facts, anecdotes, movies like The Day After Tomorrow, or advertisements for 
environmental groups. Unfortunately, framing climate change discourse as apocalyptic or 
catastrophic only causes fatalism and inaction as adherents buckle under the pressure of 
doomsday scenarios.  
 The second qualifier Lincoln identifies is a set of practices whose goal is to produce a 
proper world. As discussed earlier in the paper, the proper response for fatalism is continued 
inaction, creating a dangerous cycle and self-fulfilling prophecy. Fatalism discourages mitigation 
by confirming that inaction is the right response to the supposed imminent ecological 
apocalypse. The very reason climate change fatalism is important to study and important to fight 
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is because as a religion, its set of practices is inaction. But since as religious studies scholars we 
know how practices are established in a religion, whether by communal forces or a single 
authoritative figure, we can hopefully change those practices to incorporate actions that will help 
mitigate the worst consequences of climate change.  
 A group with a set of practices based on a discourse that assumes a transcendent authority 
will naturally distinguish themselves from other groups, forming meaningful communities. 
Although it would be tempting to diagnose environmental groups like Greenpeace as an example 
of a quasi-religious community, it is not the same type of community as the ones involved in 
climate change fatalism. Groups like Greenpeace consciously separate themselves from other 
environmental groups and from other sections of the population, like climate change deniers, that 
they feel do not practice mitigation in the right way. However, people who are actively members 
of an organization like Greenpeace are likely not practicing climate change fatalism because they 
are actively participating in mitigating climate change. No, it would be unlikely to find a self-
defined group of people who are aware they are believing in and practicing climate change 
fatalism. In fact, the “community” of climate change fatalists is so large and wide-spread across 
the United States and other Western countries that it almost operates on a cultural level instead of 
communal. Some self-proclaimed groups of secular fatalists do exist, such as “doomsday 
preppers,” individuals who prepare for an imminent end to civilization. Although some 
“preppers” are religious, many do not justify their behavior with traditional religious apocalyptic 
rhetoric, showing how the secular apocalyptic causes fatalism. Much like traditional religions, 
climate change fatalism affects most other aspects of a community or culture, including politics 
and economics. However, the community of climate change fatalists does have a defined idea of 
“non-observant outsiders” as Lincoln asserts is necessary to consider a community a religious 
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one.130 Climate change deniers, for example, are a defined outsider group from climate change 
fatalists, since the latter firmly acknowledge that climate change is a serious threat to the planet. 
Climate change fatalists have a much different doctrine and set of practices compared to both 
climate change deniers and members of groups like Greenpeace actively mitigating climate 
change. Although the community is loose and widespread, we can identify a community of 
climate change fatalists by identifying what they are not. 
 The final qualifier that helps define climate change fatalism as a religion is that all of 
these factors are combined to become an institution. “Institution” in this argument is taken in a 
looser sense, since there is no physical “church” of climate change fatalism. (Jordan, A. & 
O’Riordan, T 1999)  helps define cultural institution in his article, “Institutions, climate change, 
and cultural theory,” and defines an institution as “the multitude of means for holding society 
together, giving it a sense of purpose, and enabling it to adapt.”131 Climate change fatalism is 
instilled enough as a cultural phenomenon in society that it can be considered this type of 
institution, similar to how marriage is considered an institution. O’Riordan agrees with Lincoln 
in that institutions are “continually re-negotiated between conscious human agency and wide 
structures in society where individuals have little control, like laws, government, and 
economy.”132 Lincoln argues that an institution can be loosely formed, but must in some sense 
house the leaders that continually reaffirm the discourse, practices, and community that forms a 
religion.133 In climate change fatalism, this would include the leaders in positions where other 
individuals have little control, such as positions in government where environmental policy is 
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made. Climate change fatalism functions as an institution because it exists within the balance of 
individual agency (voting) and seemingly unreachable aspects of society (government leaders 
who actually write policy). This balance forms what O’Riordan calls the “paradox of constraint” 
that keeps institutions in power, which begs the question: do institutions shape human behavior 
or does human behavior shape institutions?134 The answer is a little bit of both, and the fatalist 
aspect of climate change fatalism helps keep this cycle going.  
 Thus, climate change fatalism fits Lincoln’s definition of a religion that uses an 
interpretation of the functionalist perspective. Climate change fatalism has a distinct and 
transcendent discourse, a set of practices (or non-practices), and a loosely based community and 
institution that reinforces social norms that discourage mitigating climate change. Additionally, 
climate change fatalism adopts apocalyptic framing similar to the biblical Apocalypse, in turn 
functioning as a secular apocalyptic religion in the United States. Climate change functions 
chiefly as a self-fulfilling prophecy that discourages climate change mitigation by making the 
supposed impending ecological catastrophe appear apocalyptic and therefore fated and out of 
human control. However, there are ways to encourage mitigation by tapping into the potential for 
religions to reinforce practices and social norms. Since Lincoln’s qualifiers for a religion build 
off each other, this must start at the first of Lincoln’s qualifiers: discourse.  
Reframing Climate Change Discourse 
 The final section of this paper will draw on several concepts discussed already in this 
paper to show how they could be used as potential solutions or alternative narratives to climate 
change fatalism. Although there are many potential strategies for mitigating climate change and 
various narratives that could be used, there is only room in this paper to discuss a handful, and I 
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want to focus on inverting different factors that directly encourage climate change fatalism to 
encourage mitigation. First I will examine how substituting determinism for fatalism could help 
encourage climate change mitigation. Then I will go back to the discussion of “shadow of the 
future” and elaborate on how this could be used to encourage policies that will benefit future 
generations. Then I will examine how nuclear power, the very technology that continues to 
proliferate in science fiction and post-apocalyptic narratives, could actually be used to help 
mitigate climate change. Finally, I will discuss how apocalyptic narratives themselves could be 
used to combat climate change fatalism, since certain apocalyptic narratives incorporate a 
redemptive, hopeful ending.  
 Fatalism discourages climate change mitigation by making the supposed impending 
ecological catastrophe appear fated, pre-determined, and out of human control. Fatalism is not 
concerned about the reasons why certain major events are fated, but is interested only in their 
significance and how these events bring meaning to human existence. Climate change fatalism 
puts society in a much different situation than if determinism predominated. Determinism would 
reach for reasons and causes of climate change catastrophes, whereas fatalism is simply 
concerned with the fact that they must happen. Therefore, the answer to climate change fatalism 
is not more education about the facts of climate change. Individual attitudes towards climate 
change are often unaffected by increased awareness about its scientific validity because fatalism 
is independent of reasons. It’s long been known that scare tactics only backfire, further 
encouraging a fatalistic attitude towards climate change.135  
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Climate change determinism, on the other hand, offers a more calculated and scientific 
approach to mitigating climate change by acknowledging the reasons behind catastrophic 
weather and other natural disasters. Although scare tactics are still widely used in discussions 
about climate change, optimist campaigns are spreading and encouraging positive thinking that 
will hopefully lead to positive action. Atmospheric scientist Andrew Dressler told The Verge that 
although individual actions have little effect on global climate change, collective individual 
actions do: “One raindrop doesn’t carve a canyon, but enough raindrops will.”136 Acknowledging 
that climate change fatalism has become a cultural mindset and replacing that with determinism 
would be a first step towards positive collective action. Substituting determinism in for fatalism 
would hopefully encourage individuals to look at their own contribution to global climate change 
in a way that is not so paralyzing, and does not inspire feelings of helplessness.  
The next potential alternative to climate change fatalism is to use the knowledge that 
many in American society suffer from a shortened shadow of the future. Again, the shadow of 
the future in this case is how long an individual thinks the planet will exist. Since, as Stoknes 
argues, most people are naturally short-termed, it is difficult to fully picture the Earth existing 
more than one or two generations after the present time. In this case, simple acknowledgment of 
the problem may be the best step towards overcoming it. Stoknes offers steps in his book What 
We Think About When We Try Not to Think About Global Warming to overcome this cognitive 
dissonance associated with climate change: (1) make the issue feel near, human, personal, and 
urgent, (2) use supportive framings that do not backfire by causing negative emotions, (3) 
provide opportunities for visible action, (4) avoid triggering denial through fear, guilt, and self-
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protection, and (5) reduce cultural and political polarization.137 These five steps all involve 
focusing more on short-term mitigation than long-term. Since the shadow of the future is often 
short in individuals, in some only lasting until their grandchildren’s generation, it would be 
beneficial to focus on mitigation projects that will reap benefits within that timeframe.  
The third alternative to climate change fatalism involves using the very technology that 
leads to fatalism, nuclear power. In the late 1940’s, following the first use of nuclear weapons on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Americans were ecstatic about the potential benefits of nuclear energy. 
Utopic imaginations painted pictures of a world with limitless energy, utilizing nuclear power for 
everything from powering cars to creating radioactive crops that would produce twice their 
normal yield. These hopes quickly turned to fears as black rain started pouring on Hiroshima and 
nuclear tests had unexpected and disastrous consequences.138 Despite these fears, nuclear power 
can still be considered a “green” technology because it produces energy without creating carbon 
emissions. Today, nuclear power plants provide about 20 percent of the United States’ 
electricity, and nuclear power is the third largest producer of electricity in the country.139 If 
framed as a solution to climate change, and if plants are given the proper funding and 
maintenance to increase safety, nuclear power could provide emission-free electricity on a wider 
scale. 
 Public opinion on nuclear power has historically been mixed and is largely dependent on 
how politicians frame the issue. In the article, “Framing trade-offs: The politics of nuclear power 
and wind energy in the age of global climate change,” Sarah Pralle and Jessica Boscarino argue 
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that before the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, a “Nuclear Renaissance” was on the 
horizon.140 Immediately following the incident, American support for nuclear energy was even 
lower than after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, at 43 percent in 2011. Since the 
Fukushima disaster has almost seven years of distance from public memory, a “Nuclear 
Renaissance” may be on the horizon again. Although nuclear power is arguably no safer today 
than it was in 1960, the perceived threat of global climate change is much higher, allowing for a 
trade-off. Yes, nuclear power has its risks, but the risks of climate change are worse. If 
politicians were to frame nuclear power as a trade-off in this way, public support may increase in 
the coming years, since polling data shows that support for nuclear energy increases if presented 
as a solution to climate change.141 
 The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) has published multiple articles with their 
official stance on using nuclear energy. The UCSUSA states that in order to prevent disastrous 
consequences from global warming, “The United States must achieve economy-wide net-zero 
emissions by or before mid-century.”142 Nuclear power offers one option for producing 
electricity without carbon emissions, despite carrying substantial health and environmental risks. 
However, nuclear plants are being shut down prematurely due to the high cost of safety 
maintenance and are being replaced with natural gas, which still produces an unacceptable level 
of carbon emissions. The UCS formally supports “policies and measures to strengthen the safety 
and security of nuclear power” so it can one day provide carbon-free electricity to the majority of 
the country.143 
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 Ontario is already making changes to their energy sector to make nuclear power more 
prevalent. On February 23, 2018, Glenn Thibeault, Canada’s energy minister, made the 
statement, “Tomorrow’s advanced nuclear technology…will play a key role in addressing 
climate change—our generation’s greatest challenge.”144 Nuclear power provides 60 percent of 
Ontario’s electricity and has successfully both eliminated coal-powered electricity in 2014 and 
made nuclear energy competitively priced compared to natural gas. Ontario has been a pioneer in 
nuclear research throughout the past decade, and provides an example of how nuclear energy 
could successfully power the United States. 
 Although there are clear health and environmental risks associated with nuclear power, 
the main obstacle facing the United States’ nuclear infrastructure right now is funding. Cuts 
would need to be made elsewhere to make room for proper care and maintenance of nuclear 
power plants. With advancements in the safety protocols for nuclear power plants, the potential 
health and environmental risks would be reduced. Furthermore, as the risks of global climate 
change continue to mount, public support for nuclear energy will likely increase. Within the next 
25 years, it’s likely that many American households will be paying a nuclear plant for their 
electricity—a 1960’s Utopian dream finally come true. Although nuclear power accelerated the 
secular apocalyptic after WWII, the technology used to create the most destructive weapons on 
the planet could be used for good as well.  
The final and perhaps most important strategy to reduce climate change fatalism is by 
using apocalyptic narratives themselves to encourage mitigation. Some scholars argue that before 
the development of nuclear weapons, traditional apocalyptic narratives focused more on 
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redemption and salvation than annihilation. As Daniel Wocjik articulates, “The prospect of 
nuclear annihilation threatens traditional religious visions of the apocalypse as a meaningful 
event…The possibility of a senseless and unredemptive nuclear apocalypse brought about by 
human ignorance, violence, or accident, is an affront to the religious belief of a morally ordered 
universe.”145 The secular apocalyptic fundamentally changed the meaning of apocalypse from an 
event that restores cosmic order and a return to Eden to an event that destroys the natural 
environment. However, returning to traditional concepts of the apocalypse could restore the 
redemptive and ordered features of apocalypses.  
Moo argues in this article, “Climate change and apocalyptic imagination,” that the 
apocalypse can actually be comforting by serving as a reminder that humans do not know all the 
answers, and do not need to know them. Moo states, “The emphasis on the necessity of divine 
revelation that is at the center of apocalyptic literature can function as a salutary reminder of the 
limitations of human knowing and stand as a warning against scientific reductionism.”146 
Arguably, the relentless pursuit of godlike knowledge is what brought nuclear weaponry and the 
secular apocalyptic in the first place, which ultimately backfired. Moo argues that since the 
apocalyptic highlights the gap between human knowledge and divine knowledge, the traditional 
apocalyptic could discourage scientific reductionism of complex problems like climate change. 
Global anthropogenic climate change is not just a scientific problem, but a social, economic, and 
religious dilemma that operates in the gray area. Furthermore, the apocalyptic “holds a vision of 
hope that is not finally dependent on human action or perfect knowledge.”147 Although it may 
seem to be a paradox, reassuring individuals that mitigating climate change is not fully 
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dependent on human action could help encourage positive action by reducing pressure. Finally, 
Moo reminds us that, “stories of potential catastrophe ask us to consider what we don’t want to 
lose.”148 The apocalypse could be a helpful tool in mitigating climate change if framed in a way 
that emphasizes health, community, and family, and what could potentially be lost.  
(Zamora, 1982) and (Foust, 2009) also discuss how reframing apocalyptic narratives of 
climate change could encourage mitigation. They both argue that the apocalypse is inherently a 
positive event, one that is supposed to bring salvation and a return to Eden. Zamora argues that 
“prophetic and apocalyptic traditions are fundamentally optimistic about the course of history: 
history is the time within which God’s plan for humanity is fulfilled.”149 The apocalypse insists 
that the world has a higher meaning and cosmic order, and will not be allowed to fall into ruin 
without eventual restoration. When applied to climate change fatalism, this attitude could bring 
greater meaning to mitigation strategies by assuring individuals that even small actions are part 
of a larger cosmic order that is restoring the planet. Zamora also argues that the apocalypse is 
ethical because it does not assert that evil actions are the most significant over the course of 
history. She argues that apocalypses, “insist that the ultimate significance of the the evils of 
history is the triumph of God’s righteousness and the redemption of humanity.”150 The 
fundamental story of the biblical apocalypse is the triumph of God over Satan, and of redemption 
over sin. Climate change fatalism would be discouraged if this narrative is emphasized in climate 
change discourse instead of the annihiliation aspect of apocalypse.  
(Foust, 2012) focuses on the potential for apocalyptic framing to inspire human agency 
instead of minimize it, arguing that, “apocalyptic discourse is inherently ambivalent, offering the 
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possibility to inspire human agency even within a ruinous scenario.”151 The biblical Apocalypse 
emphasizes the ability to people to turn to God and be saved up until the last moment, and this 
could be framed to inspire human agency and climate change mitigation. Often the secular 
apocalyptic framing of climate change discourse is discouraging, lamenting that it is already too 
late to mitigate the worst consequences of climate change. Apocalyptic framing could remind 
communities that there is always time to take action and be redeemed. Redeemed in this sense 
would mean stopping “sinful” actions such as using too many resources, and succumbing to 
fatalistic attitudes that lead to inaction. Since religions are built and maintained through 
collective social norms, reframing apocalyptic narratives of climate change may help change 
social norms to make climate change mitigation a dominant part of everyday life. As Hulme 
suggests, ‘‘Climate change is not a problem waiting for a solution . . . but a powerful idea that 
will transform the way we develop.”152 Global climate change offers American society a chance 
to further advance in scientific technology and transform everyday culture from anthropocentric 
to eco-centric.  
The goal of all the strategies I’ve outlined is to nurture individual and collective efficacy, 
and to increase awareness about global climate change in a way that does not lead to crippling 
fear of the future. Since climate change is often not experienced by people directly, direct 
confrontation with facts and future estimates likely will not lead to action. Instead, (Van der 
Linden, S. Maibach, E. & Leiserowitz, A., 2015) suggest appealing to specific social contexts to 
encourage climate change within local communities. Since “the role of experience has been 
largely ignored in climate policy making,” it may be more beneficial to focus on regional and 
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community risks that present more immediate risk to individuals.153 Although the risks are more 
immediate, they are also less global and all-encompassing, which would make mitigating climate 
change seem more feasible for individuals. Furthermore, (Linden et. al, 2015) argues that 
focusing on how the negative effects of climate change are happening now could encourage 
climate change mitigation because, “The discounting of future risk events is a pervasive feature 
of the way in which human psychology evolved.”154 Climate change fatalism is partially caused 
by focusing on theoretical future events that are exaggerated by apocalyptic framing. Focusing 
on local issues that are currently impacting individual communities would prevent many 
individuals from discounting the risks of unimpeded global climate change. Furthermore, 
(Scannell L., & Grouzet, F., 2010) agree that “people are more confident that they know the 
causes of climate change than current environmental conditions or future consequences.”155 
Many individuals do not know how climate change is impacting their local communities unless it 
is right in their backyard, and are even less confident about potential future consequences. 
Doomsday framing of future events does not increase knowledge or confidence about climate 
change, and is detrimental to perceived human agency. (Linden et. al, 2015) also acknowledges 
that most people “intrinsically care about the well-being of others and the environment.”156 This 
being the case, it would encourage climate change mitigation if local governments and grassroots 
organizations appeal to intrinsic motivations instead of use apocalyptic framing that does not 
address individuals on a relatable level.  
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Conclusion 
 This paper set out to explore the question, “Why do people who acknowledge that 
climate change is a serious threat to the planet still struggle with mitigating climate change?” 
There are many different answers to this question that stem from historic, socio-economic, and 
political roots, as well as many other factors. This paper chose to focus on the dilemma from the 
Religious Studies, Philosophical, and Psychological disciplines. As Stoknes points out, “climate 
change is the perfect moral storm, since it brings together three major ethical challenges…first, it 
is a truly global phenomenon.”157 Climate change presents the “perfect storm” because it does 
and will continue to impact nearly every aspect of human civilization, and exists within a 
framework of contradictions and paradoxes. Climate change fatalism is the paralyzing fear and 
subsequent inaction that results when climate change is predicted to result in a cataclysmic 
ecological apocalypse. This phenomenon is important to study because climate change fatalism 
discourages mitigation by minimizing human agency. Psychologists who have studied climate 
change alarmism revealed that often when people are put under too much pressure, the human 
psyche seeks to ignore those risks. This helps explain why even those who acknowledge that 
climate change is a real threat have a difficult time finding motivation to participate in even 
small mitigation practices like recycling, biking to work, and conserving resources like water and 
oil.   
 Climate change fatalism was born out of the secular apocalyptic, which has evolved with 
the modern age. Although the secular apocalyptic began with the initial industrialization of war 
in WWI, it was accelerated by the creation and use of nuclear weapons in WWII. Nuclear 
weapons are unique from other global catastrophic risks because nuclear war and consequential 
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nuclear winter could occur quickly and at any time. Nuclear power is unique in that is it both a 
product of the secular apocalyptic and a cause for its proliferation in American culture. Although 
the Cold War is long over, nuclear fears continue to cause fatalism today: “the creation and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons have fundamentally altered contemporary apocalyptic 
speculation, fueling fears of global annihilation and evoking widespread fatalism about the future 
of humanity.”158 The very existence of nuclear weapons thrust American culture into a dystopian 
mindset by using advanced technology that went too far and potentially created our own 
destruction. The very nature of dystopia is living in a world with technology that humans 
created, yet may soon become out of control. As Wocjik describes, “Fatalistic thoughts about 
nuclear war are associated not only with the tremendous destructive power of the bomb but with 
the perception that nuclear technology is unmanageable and beyond human control.”159 The 
secular apocalyptic, expressed in mass media and shows like The Twilight Zone, embodies these 
nuclear fears. These fears are part of a dangerous cycle, where fatalism is the main propellant.  
 The secular apocalyptic and climate change fatalism both operate in vicious cycles that 
create a self-fulfilling prophecy. First, nuclear weapons are both a product of the secular 
apocalyptic and help the current dystopian mindset persist in American culture. Nuclear 
disarmament policies are for the most part stagnant and depend on mutually assured destruction, 
and so nuclear weapons continue to exist and continue to serve as a daily reminder of our 
vulnerability to global annihilation. Fatalism helps turn this wheel because most people see 
nuclear war as completely out of their control, and are discouraged enough to avoid campaigning 
for or even voting for nuclear disarmament policies. Climate change fatalism operates in a 
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similar way. Since climate change is now often associated with a catastrophic ecological ending 
to human civilization, people feel helpless and powerless to stop it, and find it difficult to 
participate in climate change mitigation. Thus, global climate change continues for the most part 
unabated.  
 However, the fatalistic attitude towards climate change is based on incorrect assumptions 
about the supposed impending ecological apocalypse. The dangers that nuclear weapons pose is 
much different than even the worst potential negative consequences of global climate change. 
Whereas nuclear war could occur theoretically at any time, global warming for now is a gradual, 
nearly invisible process that will reap the worst consequences generations down the road. This 
paper also sought out to find why climate change has been framed as an impending apocalypse, 
and I argue that one of the main factors is the creation of nuclear weapons. When scientists 
began examining the environmental consequences of nuclear war, they dubbed the term “nuclear 
winter,” which admitted that a strong relationship exists between the natural environment and 
nuclear weapons. If even a relatively small number of nuclear weapons, as few as 50, were 
detonated in the world’s largest urban areas, the atmospheric smoke and ash would thrust the 
planet into a nuclear winter. This would drastically decrease global rainfall and agricultural 
output, and current models suggest that the loss of life from these environmental consequences 
would be even greater than loss of life from the initial bombs themselves. Perhaps scientists 
realized then just how dependent human life is on the natural environment, and how dangerous 
nuclear weapons are as a human creation.  
 Thus, emerging climate change discourse was influenced by these new insights about 
nuclear war and nuclear winter. Since nuclear winter is itself a catastrophic ecological event, and 
nuclear weapons had already created a fatalist mindset towards human existence, climate change 
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discourse also adopted an apocalyptic frame, creating climate change fatalism. Apocalyptic 
framing and fatalism compliment each other because both feed off fear of the unknown. The 
apocalypse provides in religion a concrete end point for humanity, and a goal to reach. It fills in 
the gap between humanity and the divine by creating a narrative where the divine eventually 
merges with humanity, bringing salvation, redemption and a return to Eden. With the secular 
apocalyptic, “secular” means anthropomorphic; humanity brings about their own destruction. 
This neglects the redemptive aspects of apocalypse, making the secular apocalypse a truly 
terrifying prospect. Fatalism also relies on fear of the unknown, and asserts that humanity has no 
agency in preventing this secular apocalypse. “Fatalism is distinguished from related concepts 
such as determinism, fortune, and destiny by the belief that human will or effort is incapable of 
altering the outcome of certain events,” leading to lethargy and inaction, which applies to both 
nuclear disarmament and mitigating climate change.160 These cycles involving the secular 
apocalypse, fatalism, and climate change is constantly in motion and effects a large portion of 
American society.  
Not only is climate change fatalism a widespread cultural mindset, but it also functions 
similar to a religion. The functionalist perspective of religion examines religion from the 
discourse, practices, communities, and institutions they form. Durkheim and Weber argue that 
religions keep communities in order by forming social norms, changing them as needed. If 
climate change fatalism is a religion, the social norm is inaction, and hopefully understanding 
that it functions similar to a religion can help scholars change the social norm to include climate 
change mitigation. Climate change fatalism fits Lincoln’s functionalist definition of religion. In 
terms of discourse, climate change fatalism professes a transcendent discourse by incorporating 
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the apocalypse in its doctrine, which is inherently transcendent and minimizes human agency. 
Climate change fatalism’s practice is inaction, and claims that continued inaction is what will 
bring a proper world. Unfortunately, a “proper world” for climate change fatalists is one where a 
catastrophic ecological ending to civilization happens, which is why this topic is important to 
study. Although there is no “church” of climate change fatalism, a clear community of fatalists 
exists when one considers how social norms keep fatalism in place. Climate change fatalism is 
an institution similar to how marriage is considered an institution. Based on social norms and 
confirmed by many policymakers and government leaders, climate change fatalism is perpetually 
reinforced in Ameican society. In this way, climate change fatalism functions as a secular 
apocalyptic religion. This knowledge can then be used to encourage climate change mitigation.  
Secular apocalyptic framing of climate change leads feelings of hopelessness, fatalism, 
and consequently inaction. Several alternative frames and narratives for climate change were 
suggested in this paper, including substituting determinism for fatalism, using shadow of the 
future to create short-term mitigation goals, using nuclear power as a green energy, and returning 
to traditional apocalyptic narratives that emphasize salvation and redemption. All of these 
strategies emphasize individual and communal agency, and focus on the causes and current 
impacts climate change has on local environments. Since fatalism is fueled by uncertainty, which 
leads to paralyzing fear and inaction. Stoknes suggests two framed for combating uncertainty: 
“preparedness and ethics.”161 By this, Stoknes argues that climate change mitigation should focus 
on preparing local communities for how climate change will impact their environment, and 
appealing to virtue and family ethics to encourage action. Global climate change gives us a 
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chance to evaluate what matters most to us (health, family, and community) and what we have to 
do to ensure a healthy environment for future generations.  
The secular apocalyptic is a consequence of industrialized war and weapons of mass 
destruction, and continues to proliferate in science fiction media. Sir John Houghton wrote for 
the Guardian in 2003 that, “The impacts of global warming are such that I have no hesitation in 
describing it as a ‘weapon of mass destruction’.”162 This apocalyptic framing of climate change 
has been thoroughly critiqued in climate change discourse, and alternative narratives for global 
climate change are still developing. Since climate change fatalism functions similar to an 
apocalyptic religion, the phenomenon holds sway over cultural and social norms. Pinpointing 
where these social norms could be altered and reinforced by this quasi-religion’s authority will 
be an important step to maximizing human agency in mitigating anthropogenic global climate 
change.  
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